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Chapter 12
Liberalization, Direction of Bias,
and Economic Growth
a appear to be the ones cut
In Chapter lithe intermediate-term impact of devaluation on resource alloca-
tion and economic growth was examined. A major conclusion was that a suc-
cessful Phase III episode has its major effect through the reduced bias toward
import substitution and the resulting improvement in export performance.
While there are numerous microeconomic changes that accompany devalua-
tion, liberalization, and altered bias, it was not possible to detect significant ef-
fects of those changes on growth performance.
It may be that the effects of Phase III are so complex that simple tests fail
to reveal them. An alternative hypothesis is that the benefits frequently
thought to emanate from microeconomic changes may depend on the long-run
direction of the bias in the trade and payments regime and not on the in-
termediate changes that follow devaluation and liberalization. It is the purpose
of this chapter to examine the long-run response of economies in which the
• bias of the regime was purposely and systematically altered. This does not
refer to regimes, such as those in the Philippines and Turkey, in which import
substitution continued with somewhat reduced bias; it includes only those that
shifted incentives, in order to rely upon export growth as a dynamic sector
spurring economic development. Unfortunately, among the countries in this
• project, only two—Brazil and South Korea—switched from import substitu-
tion to export promotion. We start, therefore, by examining the Brazilian and
South Korean experiences. While some aspects were reviewed earlier, especial-
ly in Chapter 9, the factors leading to apparent success in the two cases deserve
more careful assessment than they have so far been given.
It seems evident, based both on comparison of Brazilian and South
Korean growth under alternative biases and on the contrasts between their
growth and that of other countries, that the export-promotion bias of the trade
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and payments regime accounts for a substantial increment in the growth rate,
over and above that explained directly by the growth of exports. The impor-
tant question is why this should be so. It is to that question that the second sec-
tion of this chapter is addressed. A final section then summarizes the findings
with regard to the questions posed in Chapter 4, evaluating the role of
liberalization, bias reduction, rationalization, and reduced variance in affect-
ing economic performance,
I. THE BRAZILIAN AND SOUTH KOREAN EXPERIENCES
The Transformations
A great deal has already been said about the Brazilian and South Korean
export-oriented growth. Nonetheless, it seems.desirable to review some of the
salient facts.' There are significant differences between the two countries.
Brazil's population, land area, and resource base are large. South Korea has a
population one-third the size, but she also has the highest population density
of any country in the world and one of the poorest resource bases per capita.
Although in the 1950s both countries followed development strategies heavily
oriented toward import substitution, their growth performance differed.
Brazil's growth rate was rapid throughout most of the decade partly because
she managed to attract private foreign investment which softened the impact
of stagnant foreign exchange earnings. South Korea was recovering from the
combined effects of Japanese occupation (which lasted from 1910 until the end
of World War II), partition of the country, and the Korean War. Despite that
the South Korean growth rate averaged just under 5 percent for the five years
after 1954, and that was possible only by virtue of large inflows of foreign
aid.2 South Korea embarked upon an export-promotion strategy in the early
1960s, after several years of very slow growth, and the growth rate rose sharp-
ly. Brazil's growth rate fell off markedly after 1961 and remained sluggish un-
til 1967.
Despite all the differences the turnaround in economic performance has
been strikingly similar in a variety of ways. Each economic system was altered
to provide a bias toward exports,3 but the consequent growth of exports was
substantially more rapid than had been anticipated by even the most optimistic
planners. In South Korea the numbers seem almost implausible: export earn-
ings grew from $33 million in 1960, to $175 million in 1965, to $882 million in
1970, and to $4,460 million in 1974—an average annual rate of growth in ex-
cess of 40 percent. Simultaneously, foreign aid tapered off in the mid-1960s;
policies were deliberately adopted to attract private foreign capital, and this
contributed to South Korea's ability to maintain a sizable current account
deficit. The rate of growth of GNP was 8.6 and 6.1 percent in 1964 and 1965,
rising to an average rate of 10.3 percent from 1966 to 1972.
The Brazilian ti
ings did not reattain
were $1,596 million.
in 1967 but thereaft(
an average annual r
with zero growth in
of real GDP from
through 1973 it ave
nessed virtual stagn
growth rate of abou
There is little di
economic growth
in Brazil. Savings rat
ly. Marginal capital!
inflation, which had
The important
substitution to expoi
growth experienced.
looking strategy of t
economic growth. Fi
time, that earlier im
and that it was the s
For South Kore
factors they believe
growth. Those specii
even after taking thei
sion:
These special factors
cess of the South
tribution: tax and go
exchange rate refor
reliance on
evidence that export
particularly as a sour
the bias toward exp
substitution. The cx]
without being
creasingly open econ
that lessened the eco
The questions, then
Korean situations un
the success of the e
OWTH
it in the growth rate,
exports. The impor-
n that the second sec-
Lmarizes the findings
aluating the role of
d variance in affect-
IENCES
and South Korean
o review some of the
the two countries.
South Korea has a
t population density
rce bases per capita.
strategies heavily
rformance differed.
ecade partly because
softened the impact
recovering from the
rn 1910 until the end
War. Despite that
for the five years
e inflows of foreign
strategy in the early
rate rose sharp-
mained sluggish Un-
performance has
c system was altered
wth of exports was
the most optimistic
usible: export earn-
5, to $882 million in
ate of growth in ex-
ff in the mid-1960s;
gn capital, and this
ble current account
it in 1964 and 1965,
72;
BRAZILIAN AND SOUTH KOREAN FXPERIENCES 279
The Brazilian transformation started in late 1967. Brazilian export earn-
ings did not reattain their 1954 peak of $1,558 million until 1965, when they
were $1,596 million. After an increase in 1966, they fell back to $1,654 million
in 1967 but thereafter rose steadily to $6,199 million in 1973. This represented
an average annual rate of increase of over 25 percent per annum, contrasted
with zero growth in the preceding period. The average annual rate of growth
of real GDP from 1962 through 1967 was 3.7 percent, whereas from 1968
through 1973 it averaged 10.15 percent. The earlier period, therefore, wit-
nessed virtual stagnation in per capita income, and the latter period saw a
growth rate of about 7.5 percent per capita annually.
There is little doubt that both the qualitative and quantitative nature of
economic growth changed sharply in 1964-1966 in South Korea and after 1967
in Brazil. Savings rates, which had been stagnant in earlier periods, rose sharp-
ly. Marginal capital/output ratios fell. In both countries, interestingly enough,
inflation, which had been very rapid in earlier years, slowed remarkably.
The important issues pertain to the role of the switch from import
substitution to export promotion in altering the quality and type of economic
growth experienced. For Brazil there seems little doubt that the outward-
looking strategy of the late 1960s was responsible for the heightened pace of
economic growth. Fishlow concludes that it was the appropriate policy for that
• time, that earlier import-substitution policies had outlived their usefulness,
and that it was the shift in policies which made rapid growth possible.4
For South Korea, Frank, Kim, and Westphal cited a number of special
factors they believe contributed in important ways to South Korea's rapid
growth. Those special circumstances are considered in more detail below. But
even after taking them into account, the authors reached the following conclu-
sion:
These special factors, however, are not sufficient in themselves to explain the suc-
cess of the South Korean economy. Economic policies made an important con-
tribution: tax and government expenditure reforms, the interest rate reforms, the
exchange rate reforms, and the general emphasis on export promotion and
reliance on international prices were some of the most critical. There is some
evidence that export promotion was a bit overdone—greater reliance on tariffs
particularly as a source of revenue may have generated slightly more growth—but
the bias toward exports was far preferable to a strong bias in favor of import
substitution. The export bias allowed efficient industries to establish themselves
without being limited in size by the domestic market. The export bias led to art in-
creasingly open economy and generated a growing share of the foreign exchange
that lessened the economy's dependence on foreign capital imports. . . .'
The questions, therefore, are twofold: (1) Were the Brazilian and South
Korean situations unique, and to what extent did special circumstances make
the success of the export promotion strategy possible in those two cases?
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(2) Why should export orientation reduce variance and otherwise contribute
indirectly, as well as directly, to a higher rate of economic growth?
Contribution of Special Circumstances
Special circumstances surround the determination of real GNP in every coun-
try in every year. It is always difficult to distinguish the factors that truly make
a particular situation unique from those that simply happen to coincide with
the systematic determinants of growth patterns. This is especially true in con-
sidering the contribution of a particular factor—in this case the export-push
policies—to economic growth. All that can be done is to consider some of the
factors that are often thought to be special about the Brazilian and South
Korean experience; isolating these factors permits evaluation of the hypothesis
that export bias accounts for a considerable part of the high growth rates
achieved by those two countries and that their experience can probably be
duplicated. Fortunately there are two countries—not just one—which had the
same general experience, and that fact helps in identifying the role of special
circumstances.
A number of particular factors have been mentioned as alternative ex-
planations of Brazil's and South Korea's excellent growth performance. They
include: (1) South Korea's proximity to the rapidly growing Japanese market
may have made it relatively easy for her to increase exports; (2) in both South
Korea and Brazil a strong government assured the continuity of the export-
promotion policy, prevented undue increases in wages, and took the other
measures necessary for export growth that might not have been possible under
a weaker government; (3) foreign aid to South Korea, and private capital
flows into both countries, made a sizable contribution to total investment; and
(4) financial markets were reformed in both countries, and those changes may
account for the higher growth rates.
No one knows how to measure the contribution—if any—of each of these
factors, but a number of considerations cast doubt on the extent to which they
downgrade either the contribution of export promotion or the repeatability of
the experience. These considerations are outlined below.
1. The first contention, that South Korea's proximity to Japan facilitated
export growth, undoubtedly has an element of truth to it. However, expansion
of South Korea's exports to other markets was more rapid than the growth of
her exports to Japan. Japan received 63 percent of all South Korea's exports in
1960 and only 38 percent in 1973; in contrast, the United States' share of South
Korean exports was 7 percent in 1960 and 32 percent in 1973 (after being as
high as 52 percent in 1968). Moreover, Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philip-
pines, as well as other countries, had equal access to the Japanese market. In
those countries, growth rates for exports were satisfactory, but none achieved
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2. While it is evident that Brazil had a very strong government when it em-
barked upon the shift to export promotion, that is not as apparent for South
Korea. It will be recalled that there was a student revolution in South Korea in
1960. Further, the government that presided over the switch in policy had just
assumed office, and although its powers increased in later years it cannot be
regarded as having been firmly in command in the early years of the export-
promotion strategy. Moreover, some countries which have had strong govern-
ments have not adopted successful policies; the Philippines and Indonesia are
• cases in point in recent years. The Ghanaian government before 1966 was cer-
tainly strong enough to impose whatever economic policies it deemed
desirable, and most observers would have regarded the Turkish government of
1950-1958 and the Egyptian government of the fifties and sixties as "strong."
While it seems to be very important that exporters be assured of the commit-
ment of their government to an export-promotion strategy, that commitment
can grow from the very success of the export-promotion efforts and the
popular consensus that then emerges in its support. In a sense it may well be
that the success of the export-promotion strategy, itself, strengthens the
government while simultaneously generating support at all levels for continu-
ing the strategy.
3. The policies that made the export-promotion strategy possible were
also policies that attracted private foreign capital flows into South Korea and
Brazil. It is difficult to imagine that those countries would have received
capital inflows of the size they did had their exchange rates been overvalued
and their domestic markets sheltered by import prohibitions. Although Brazil
had been the recipient of private foreign investment in the 1950s under her
import-substitution strategy, that investment had fallen off sharply in the early
1960s when opportunities for "easy" import substitution dried up. For South
Korea, aid was very extensive in the 1950s, but that was not the period of rapid
growth. While the reconstruction that those aid inflows allowed may have
been a necessary condition for later success, the high growth rate experienced
in the late 1960s occurred after aid had largely ended. Indeed, part of South
Korea's export growth replaced aid inflows.
4. The financial reforms undertaken in Brazil and South Korea un-
doubtedly contributed to improved economic performance. In the South
Korean case, however, those reforms took place four to five years after ex-
ports began growing rapidly. In the Brazilian case the reforms were much less
far-reaching and, in any event, were necessary for export growth. They provid-
ed greater assurance about the future of the real exchange rate, certainly a
prerequisite of significant improvement in export performance. Therefore,
while those reforms were significant, their contribution was in their interaction
with the export-push growth strategy.
OWTH
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Importance of Bias toward Exports, Realistic
Exchange Rates, and Liberalization
Estimates of the contributions of exports and of liberalized trade regimes to
growth were presented in Chapter 11. If those estimates in Table 11-2 are ap-
plied to the South Korean and Brazilian data, they suggest that the contribu-
tion of rapid export growth was sizable compared with previous periods of ex-
port stagnation. The estimates would indicate that Brazil's 25 percent rate of
growth of export earnings increased her growth rate by 2.75 percentage points;
the 40 percent rate of growth of export earnings in South Korea increased
GNP growth by 4.4 percentage points. Those numbers are far larger than the
direct contribution that would be calculated by simply taking the increment in
exports relative to the increase in GNP.
port stagnation. The estimates would indicate that Brazil's 25 percent rate of
growth of export earnings increased her growth rate by 2.75 percentage points;
the 40 percent rate of. growth of export earnings in South Korea increased
GNP growth by 4.4 percentage points. Those numbers are far larger than the
direct contribution that would be calculated by simply taking the increment in
exports relative to the increase in GNP.
What distinguishes the South Korean and Brazilian export-push strategies
from the Phase IV periods of other countries, such as Turkey and the Philip-
pines, is not necessarily the level of the real exchange rate relative to some stan-
dard, but rather the fact that South Korea and Brazil were systematically pro-
moting exports in addition to having liberalized their regimes. And while it is
true that an export-promotion strategy would be extremely difficult, if not im-
possible, to carry out without a fair degree of liberalization and a relatively
realistic exchange rate, the converse is not the case. Many countries have
had—for shorter or longer periods—fairly liberal trade and payments regimes
and have nonetheless maintained a bias toward import substitution.
The conclusion is not that export push itself accounts for all of the dif-
ference in performance that is not explained by special factors or the extent of
liberalization of the regime; it is rather that the logic of an export-promotion
strategy seems to condition a number of other policies and to permit a number
of other favorable factors to appear in a fairly systematic way. However, the
mere absence of an import-substitution bias does not seem to provide this
push. Although economic theory suggests that incentives for exports and for
import substitution should be equated at the margin, in fact neither Brazil nor
South Korea did so; during the rapid growth years the bias in their regimes was
toward exports. In some regards the sorts of intervention undertaken on
behalf of exports in those regimes appear to have been similar to those under-
taken by other countries in support of their import-substitution approaches.
There are numerous countries where incentives for export and import
substitution have been about equal, and the results have not been spectacular.
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Sri Lanka in the 1950s and Indonesia since 1966 (although export earnings
have grown rapidly due to expansion of oil exports) are two instances of coun-
tries where the trade and payments regime was exceptionally liberal but where
there were few incentives to stimulate domestic production in any direction.
There have also been countries that have fostered import substitution
under a liberalized trade and payments regime, and that, too, has resulted in a
less-than-spectacular growth performance; of the countries covered by the
project, the Philippines is the outstanding instance. Philippine export growth
was undoubtedly greater than it would have been had QRs, rather than tariffs,
been the instrument of protection of domestic industry in the l960s, and the
Philippines probably performed better than would have been the case had QRs
been applied to maintain a more overvalued exchange rate. Nonetheless,
Baldwin believes that the bias toward import substitution left the economy
performing at a far less satisfactory rate than was feasible. The Chilean
sliding-peg experience of 1965-1970 represents another instance of a country
where export earnings were adequate (due to rising copper prices) but where a
liberalized trade and payments regime did not result in any marked change in
the performance of the economy. The reason, it seems, lies in the Chilean
failure to alter the bias in the regime and also in the maintenance of the sliding
peg at a rate Behrman judges to have been substantially overvalued.
While examples can never prove a case, the evidence available from the
country studies is certainly consistent with the hypothesis that it was the bias
toward exports which accounts for the spectacular performance of South
Korea after 1964 and Brazil after 1968. This export bias, in turn, placed im-
plied limits on the degree to which QRs could be used and on the degree to
which the exchange rate was overvalued. Other factors, of course, explain
some of the difference, but the commitment to an export-oriented growth
strategy is the factor that was absent from the Indonesian, Philippine,
Chilean, and other experiences with liberalizing the trade and payments
regime.
II. EXPORT-PROMOTION VERSUS IMPORT-SUBSTITUTION
GROWTH STRATEGIES
The above considerations strongly suggest that bias toward export promotion
resulted in faster growth than did bias toward import substitution. Economic
performance seems to have improved by considerably more than the direct
contribution of the increment in exports. The important question is why that
should have been so. Unfortunately, data with which to attempt a quantitative
answer to the question are simply unavailable. All that can be done is to con-
sider a variety of factors that might account for the rapid growth that seems to
result when bias is toward exports.
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There are, broadly, two classes of influences that appear to make an
export-oriented growth strategy more conducive to rapid growth than one
based on import substitution. First, there are some strictly economic factors,
such as returns to scale, indivisibilities, and the impact of competition, that
probably produce a more satisfactory economic performance under an export-
oriented strategy than under import substitution. Second, an export-
promotion strategy appears to place certain kinds of constraints upon
economic policy and its implementation; those constraints, in turn, limit the
magnitude and duration of policy mistakes and also tend to force policies to
work through pricing, rather than quantitative, interventions. These in-
fluences suggest a certain logic to the evolution of economic policy under each
strategy. It is possible that it is the evolution of import-substitution over time,
rather than the level of bias itself, that accounts for the generally less satisfac-
tory performance of such regimes.
The factors whose influence on growth performance may differ according
to the bias of the regime are considered on the following pages. The alternative
of a strictly laissez-faire regime is not explored; rather, the comparison is be-
tween two conscious, active policies to encourage growth. Perhaps what is-
really at issue is that a growth strategy oriented toward exports entails the
development of policies that make markets and incentives function better,
while an import-substitution strategy usually involves policies designed to
frustrate individuals" maximizing behavior under market incentives. Both
strategies are nonetheless interventionist and activist, at least as they were car-
ried out by developing countries since 1945.
Economic Factors
There are four major economic considerations, a priori, which support the
presumption that growth performance under export promotion may be
superior to that under import substitution. They are: (1) relaxation of the link
between agriculture and industry; (2) the degree to which economies of scale
can be exploited; (3) the effects of competition on the performance of in-
dividual firms; and (4) the likelihood of "foreign exchange shortage," with its
deleterious effects on growth. Two additional considerations are usually put
forward in support of import substitution—infant industry protection and the
vagaries and uncertainties associated with reliance upon the international
economy.
THE AGRICULTURE-INDUSTRY LINK
As every development planner knows, a large agricultural sector is a drag
on the growth rate. Increases in agricultural productivity are hard to achieve,
-
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yet urban growth is likely to be closely linked to the fortunes of agriculture in a
variety of ways in economies where focus is upon import substitution. If
agricultural output lags or declines, the resulting increase in food prices
generally raises urban wages, thereby tending to limit industrial expansion.
Savings and tax revenues are often difficult to obtain from the rural sector, so
slow rural growth constrains urban growth but rapid agricultural growth does
not necessarily provide resources for more urban growth.7 For that reason it is
often argued that the "success stories" of Hong Kong and Singapore have no
relevance for other developing countries precisely because those economies
have no rural sector.
It is obvious that the agricultural sector's productivity must increase for
satisfactory economic growth, and there is no way of avoiding the problem
regardless of policy bias. Nonetheless, one of the features of an export-
oriented growth strategy is that the link between the fortunes of the urban and
the rural sectors is not quite so tight as it is under import substitution, especial-
ly in the short run.
In the South Korean case, for example, the agricultural growth rate was
satisfactory and increased sharply in the 1960s. But there were bad harvest
years; in fact, Frank, Kim, and Westphal attribute the failure of the 1961
devaluation to a poor harvest and attendant price increase. Prior to the export-
push strategy, bad harvests resulted in increased domestic inflation, rapidly
rising food prices, and retardation in industrial growth. Since 1964, however,
• the growth of South Korea's industrial sector has been less directly dependent
upon the short-term fortunes of the agricultural sector because food imports
can supplement domestic output in poor years. In Brazil the situation has been
• rather different because Brazil appears to have a comparative advantage in
some agricultural commodities. There, opening up the economy implied that
Brazil was more likely to exercise her comparative advantage in agriculture as
soybean and corn output increased, while domestic demand for wheat pro-
ducts could be satisfied increasingly from imports.
In theory it can be argued that the amount of foreign exchange available
for compensating for shortfalls in agricultural output should be identical
under export push or import substitution if it is assumed that resources
devoted to earning and saving foreign exchange have the same return at the
margin. In practice there seem to be a number of reasons why this does not
happen.8 First, in addition to their holdings of foreign exchange reserves, the
export-oriented countries have had ready access to the private international
financial market as well as to official lenders; they could quickly and easily
• borrow, whereas countries oriented toward import substitution by and large
had already used the lines of credit available to them on terms at which they
were willing to borrow. Second, and closely related to the first, the import-
substitution countries appear generally to have been unduly optimistic about
future foreign exchange earnings in relation to import demands; thus, their
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foreign exchange reserves were almost always very close to minimum levels,
while export-oriented countries seem to have accumulated reserves at more
rapid rates than expected. Third, even when the import-substitution countries
did resort to purchasing food imports from abroad, the scarcity of available
foreign exchange for other essential imports implied a very high opportunity
cost for its utilization for food imports; as a result the quantity of food im-
ported was relatively smaller than it would have been had foreign exchange
earnings been more plentiful.
Most of the economies that relied upon an import-substitution strategy
experienced reduced industrial growth due to poor agricultural harvests at one
time or another. For example, Bhagwati and Srinivasan document the link be-
tween agriculture and industry in India and note the disastrous effects of the
drought, not only on per capita income—which was inevitable—but also on in-
dustrial production. This might have been avoided under an alternative set of
government investment policies.9
ECONOMIES OF SCALE
To the extent that scale economies exist and are functions of output levels
in individual industries, it is clear that an export-push strategy, relying upon
selective expansion of industries, will dominate an import-substitution strategy
where each industry's growth is limited, a la Nurkse, to the growth of domestic
demand for its product. This conclusion follows whether scale economies
prevail indefinitely or whether instead there is a certain minimum economic
size for firms in an industry.
The argument is clearly of greater importance the smaller the country.
However, low per capita incomes make the internal market for most nontradi-
tional commodities very small in all but the very largest countries. Even in-
India the internal market is not large: in 1972/73, the value of all manufactur-
ing output was $7.1 billion at current prices at the official exchange
total exports were $2.3 billion, and primary commodities accounted for about
85 percent,11 leaving $345 million of manufactured exports. South Korean
manufacturing output was $2.3 billion in 1972—again valued at the official
rate; exports of manufactured commodities were $1.6 billion, so that approx-
imately half of all manufactured output was exported. 2
While these numbers do not indicate fully the selectivity of the production
pattern in South Korea relative to India, it is apparent that Indian manufactur-
ing production was destined primarily for the internal market and covered a
much wider range of commodities than the South Korean output. For coun-
tries smaller than India the domestic market for manufacturing commodities
is, in the early stages of development, very small.
This is not to suggest that under an export-oriented strategy new in-
dustries should not start by catering to the home market. Indeed, when pro-
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Indeed, when pro- j
duction begins, most export-oriented industries will serve the domestic market
first simply because the differentials between f.o.b. and c.i.f. prices will
naturally make domestic sales more attractive. In some instances, sales may be
primarily for exports even at an early stage, but in many cases the home
market is sizable.'3 The important consideration is probably that, under an ex-
port promotion strategy, new firms (even those in the import substitution
stage) are basing their plans on both the domestic and export markets. A plant
of economic size can be constructed because entrepreneurs anticipate future
participation in the world market.
In contrast, under import substitution, plans are based entirely or almost
entirely on the profitability of the sheltered domestic market and the monopo-
ly power that accrues to those starting new production activities. Monopoly
power, exercised by increasing the domestic price of the commodity above its
international level, reduces still further the already small size of the domestic
market. Worse yet, even in industries that might realize some positive return
by building capacity for the export market, there are generally safer and more
attractive investments in new product lines in protected import-substitution in-
dustries.
It is impossible to estimate the importance of the increased ability to take
advantage of scale economies and to adjust to indivisibilities in making export
promotion the more rewarding strategy. What can be said is that an export-
push strategy is likely to enable such economies to be realized, whereas an
import-substitution strategy provides definite limits to the expansion of output
capacities in existing production lines.
COMPETITION
One means of encouraging export industries has been to extend sheltered
positions in the domestic market to successful exporters. Nonetheless, they
must compete satisfactorily in the international market. Meeting international
competition requires not only cost consciousness, but also quality control,
meeting customers' style preferences, changing product lines with new
technological developments, meeting delivery dates on time, and other re-
quisites of a modern industrial society. Import substitution firms typically
face, at most, two or three competitors, and there are often barriers to any
competition among them. Allocation of licenses to expand or to import needed
intermediate goods often effectively determines the market share of each firm,
even when there is more than one producer. The competitive spurs that are
present under export promotion are replaced with a protected environment in
which substandard quality and high costs do not prevent profitability.
The effects of this difference in the competitive environment can be
evaluated in terms of their implications for individual firms and of their im-
pact on industry composition over time. Competitive pressures will certainly
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be less under import substitution than under export promotion. If managers
allocate their time optimally among their various functions, more managerial
time and effort will be devoted to plant efficiency and to cost and quality con-
trol under an export-push strategy than under import substitution. That fact
alone should result in higher productivity in firms with an export orientation.
In addition, under import substitution the very forces that tend to result in pro
rata allocations of licenses to import intermediate inputs or to increase capaci-
ty also tend to provide an environment wherein entrepreneurs can—if they so
choose—be lazy, and the mechanism to drive out incompetent managers is
weak or nonexistent. Entrepreneurs may take advantage of their monopoly
position by enjoying the "quiet life," and in so doing they may not strive as
much for productivity increases, cost reductions, and quality improvements as
they would if they faced more competitive pressures.
Industry composition under import substitution is likely to change less
rapidly in favor of the firms with high productivity growth and low costs. With
a regime biased toward exports, the firms that survive and expand will be those
that succeeded in competing in international markets. These firms can increase
their penetration of international markets, get access to credit because of their
performance, and find it profitable to expand. Those unsuccessful in expor-
ting are not eligible for as many export incentives and must either mend their
ways or grow slowly, if at all. Under import substitution, for high-cost and
low-cost firms alike, growth in most activities is limited by the growth of
domestic demand. The tendency toward equal treatment of all firms, inherent
in most licensing mechanisms, enables high-cost firms to expand more than
they otherwise would, and retards the growth of low-cost firms.
Over time, therefore, it is likely that industry composition will shift more
rapidly toward low-cost activities under export promotion and that, within in-
dustries, this shift toward low-cost firms will be more pronounced. In addi-
tion, all firms will have devoted more resources to cost-reduction and produc-
tivity growth. The net result is likely to be a mix of firms and industries more
heavily weighted toward low-cost activities.'4 As with other contrasts between
export promotion and import substitution, there is nothing absolute about this
tendency. It is simply one more factor which, at the margin, is likely to in-
crease the rate of growth of output under export push relative to that likely to
be achieved under import substitution.
No FOREIGN EXCHANGE SHORTAGE
By definition an export-oriented growth strategy relies on foreign-
exchange earning activities to be the "leading growth" sectors. When the
growth of export industries slows, other sectors also experience a slowdown,
and the decline in the growth of foreign exchange earnings is likely to be
paralleled by a decline in the rate of growth of demand for foreign exchange.
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Even if demand does not adjust immediately, past export growth is likely to
have resulted in a moderately comfortable reserve position, so that small
deviations from expected balance-of-payments positions can be financed from
reserves. In addition the country is likely to be credit-worthy and able to bor-
row funds on acceptable terms in order to smooth whatever adjustments may
be required. The balance-of-payments position of an export-oriented country
is also protected because of the fact that the country must, of necessity, main-
tain a realistic exchange rate. Consequently, even when aggregate demand
management is unduly expansionary, domestic prices—and not the foreign
trade sector—bear most of the burden of adjustment because the exchange
rate must generally be altered rather quickly following domestic inflation.
All these factors tend to lead to a relatively comfortable balance-of-
payments positions wherein shortfalls in foreign exchange earnings can be met
because the country is able to buy time to adjust. In contrast, import-
substitution economies with overvalued exchange rates are plagued by foreign
exchange shortages." When shortfalls in earnings occur, policies to adapt to
the change result in a reduction in the rate of economic growth.
There is no doubt that foreign exchange shortage can slow down the rate
of growth below that which would otherwise be attainable. At a
microeconomic level, partly finished projects stand idle awaiting imports,
while production processes are disrupted with consequent increases in costs.
These factors reduce the growth of real output on the supply side. At a
macroeconomic level, planned investment (with its high import content) may
be reduced due to existing or anticipated shortages of foreign exchange. Also,
restrictive macroeconomic policies may be applied to cut back on planned in-
vestment levels in response to unanticipated balance-of-payments difficulties,
with consequent deleterious effects on growth rates.
The most vivid illustration of this point comes from Colombia. That
country's shift toward an export-oriented growth strategy in 1967 has already
been described. concluded that the increased rate of growth that followed
resulted more from the steadier foreign exchange situation than from anything
else.'6 In his judgment the ability of the Colombian authorities to manage their
dOmestic macroeconomic policies without regard to short-term balance-of-
payments dictates was perhaps the biggest reason for increased growth.
As with each of the other considerations, an export-push strategy is not
certain to result in fewer balance-of-payments problems, but there is a
presumption in that direction. Conversely, import substitution is not
necessarily bound to result in foreign exchange shortage, but it is likely to.
INFANT INDUSTRY CONSIDERATIONS
A number of arguments have been put forward in favor of import
substitution. Among them are that: (1) a higher level of savings may result;
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(2) technological know-how will increase more rapidly; and (3) innovative It is difficult
capacity will develop only via import substitution. Bhagwati has examined would appear to
these and related arguments in his companion volume and finds no support for dependent, if not
them, countries have b
There remains, however, the argument that it takes time to set up new in- "foreign
dustries and that protection of some sort is needed during this period of "in- growth under imr
fancy." The theoretical arguments on the subject are well known'7 and cast sector is a large Si
considerable doubt upon the desirability of a policy of overall protection corn- dent." If, howe'
pared with other policies designed to encourage new industries, domestic econom
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It is difficult to extend analysis beyond that observation. The evidence
would appear to be that import-substitution economies have been at least as
dependent, if not more so, upon the international market as the export-push
countries have been. One symptom of this is the frequency with which
"foreign exchange shortage" has constituted an important impediment to
growth under import substitution. If dependence means that the foreign trade
sector is a large share of GNP, then export-push economies are more "depen-
dent." If, however, dependence instead implies the vulnerability of the
domestic economy to international economic events, it would appear that the
import-substitution countries have been more dependent.'8 A principal reason
is that imports have already been largely reduced to commodities not
domestically produced.
Some light is shed on the issue by comparing experiences following the
commodity price adjustments—especially the increased price of oil—in
1973/74. Those events occurred after the cutoff dates of the NBER country
studies. Nonetheless, it has been painfully evident that the economies most in-
capable of adjusting to altered relative scarcities were those in South Asia and
parts of Africa and Latin America whose reliance upon import substitution
and an inner-oriented development strategy was greatest.9 While recession in
the industrialized countries has certainly adversely affected growth prospects
of countries such as South Korea, the ability of that country's economy to
adapt seems to have been far greater than that of the South Asian countries.
Ironically, the countries more affected by the vagaries of the international
market were those whose policies were intended to make them more self-
sufficient, while the countries better able to cope were those presumably more
dependent upon the world economy.
The Nature of Economic Policy
The factors discussed above all lead to a presumption that, on average, a given
degree of bias toward export promotion will result in more satisfactory
economic growth than will the same departure from equal incentives in the
direction of import substitution. Economic theory suggests that, at least for
static efficiency, ideal economic policy would equate marginal incentives for
import substitution and for export promotion; it is not immediately evident
how dynamic considerations would change the prescription. Why, then, would
bias toward exports be advocated when theory suggests equal treatment of all
sectors?
The answer appears to lie in the nature of the economic policies that seem
to accompany the alternative strategies. No government of a developing coun-
try is going to take a passive stance toward economic development, and pro-
bably none should do so. Under those circumstances it is important to consider
the determinants of the policies undertaken, the environment within which
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decisions are made, and the policy instruments used in pursuit of economic
growth.
The decision to develop through export promotion or through import
substitution affects the choice of policies and policy instruments and their
evolution. The experience reviewed in the country studies suggests that those
choices, in turn, affect expectations, the extent of variance associated with any
degree of bias, and a host of other variables in systematic ways.
Consideration of these issues can best be undertaken in two parts. First,
there is the nature of the instruments used in support of each strategy. Second,
there is the degree to which policy mistakes are self-perpetuating. An export-
push strategy seems to be less likely to result in increasing the bias of the
regime toward exports, while import substitution seems to have built-in
tendencies toward ever-greater bias. 20
THE SUPERIORITY OF PRICE OVER
QUANTITATIVE INTERVENTIONS
An export-promotion strategy generally tends to be accompanied by
primary reliance upon pricing incentives rather than quantitative controls. The
use of price measures limits the degree of variance of the regime and makes the
cost of policy interventions more apparent compared to the effects of QRs.
There is, moreover, reason to believe that policies which provide incentives to
individuals are considerably more effective than those which attempt to pre-
vent them from undertaking profitable activities.
There are a number of reasons why a QR regime is largely incompatible
with an export-push growth strategy. First and foremost an export-push
strategy is by nature concerned with the international market, over which
policy makers obviously do not, and cannot, have control; not even the most
regulation-oriented civil servant or politician believes that he can regulate
foreigners' decisions. In contrast, an import-substitution strategy implies that
economic activity of both buyers and sellers will be oriented toward the
domestic market. Whether, in fact, this market is more controllable or not,
there is certainly no obvious barrier to imposing regulations on transactions,
to requiring firms to buy from domestic firms (for example, by domestic con-
tent requirements), and to imposing any other quantitative regulations upon
them. Apparent control over economic activity thus seems fairly complete.
Aside from an obvious inability to control foreigners, the difficulty of
controlling firms selling on the international market is considerably greater
than that of regulating domestic import-substitution firms. There is, first of
all, considerably less information, and exporters' statements are thus much
more difficult to verify than are statements of import-substitution firms within
a regulated environment. For example, a successful export-promotion strategy
is certainly going to have to allow exporters to purchase foreign-made in-
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termediate inputs if the quality of inputs available domestically is Yet
the determination of inferiority must really rest on the statement of the ex-
porter, and the penalty for failing to allow these imports may be the failure to
export.
As a corollary to those considerations, regulations cannot make exporting
profitable, but they can make import substitution profitable. Many countries,
including export-oriented ones such as South Korea, and import-substitution
ones such as India, have extended import licenses for high-premium items to
exporters. Such privileges, however, cannot by themselves create a bias toward
exports, because they require import restrictions of even greater magnitude to
generate the premium on the import licenses. This can be most readily seen by
assuming that all import licenses are given to exporters and that receipt of such
licenses constitutes the only export "incentive."2' In such a case the regime
would have no bias with balanced trade because the average premium on im-
ports—that is, the average amount of protection through QRs—would exactly
equal the implicit value of the incentive per unit of exports. Usually, therefore,
allotting the implicit value of domestic controls to exporters can offset part of
the bias toward import substitution, and it might even constitute an incentive
for. a small fraction of exports, but it would never in itself bias the regime
• toward exports.22
Pricing interventions necessarily operate by altering the profitability of
activities and by providing incentives for individuals to alter their behavior. In
contrast, controls can either create incentives or attempt to thwart behavior.
that would otherwise be profitable. Regardless of which they do, it is often dif-
ficult to ascertain their effects or to judge the response to them. It is for that
reason that the authorities are likely to have a better notion as to the effects of
their policies under pricing interventions than under QRs.
It is impossible, given the present state of knowledge, to test whether, and
to what extent, market incentives are more effective than quantitative con-
trols. Reading of the country studies suggests, however, that policy was more
effective in the South Korean and Brazilian cases than in other countries.
Compare, for example, the long discussion in the India study on the political
ramifications of devaluation in 1966 with the account of. the 1964 South
Korean devaluation. The Bhagwati-Srinivasan report of the reaction to the In-
dian devaluation strongly suggests an environment in which earlier decisions
had been ineffective and disputes over devaluation made rational policy
discussion impossible. The Indian import-substitution strategy seems to have
led to deep-seated suspicion of any alteration of the exchange rate. It may be
that the use of QRs to prevent otherwise profitable behavior creates a climate
of suspicion between government officials and entrepreneurs, so that
economic decisions become political ones in countries relying on QRs to imple-
ment import-substitution policies. In contrast there was virtually no discussion
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of the motives for the 1964 devaluation decision in South Korea, and Frank,
Kim, and Westphal did not report any evidence of political divisions over the
issue. At that time, political discussion was not suppressed, and it seems clear
that opposition to devaluation could have been voiced. In effect the commit-
ment to an export-promotion strategy appears to have implied an acceptance
of the necessity for a realistic exchange rate.
CONSTRAINTS ON POLICY
Under an export-promotion strategy, policies of necessity rely on market
instruments, and control over exporters is less than complete. Thus there are
important policy constraints that are absent under import substitution. Other
factors that follow from the nature of the difference in the two strategies are
also likely to work toward policy moderation. In particular, under export pro-
motion there are grounds for expecting that: (1) there will be more balanced
political pressures from competing economic interests; (2) the greater visibility
of costs of alternative policies will likely reduce the variance in incentives and
perhaps also diminish the size (or at least duration) of policy mistakes that are
inevitable under any government; and (3) there will be less likelihood of a
crisis atmosphere in which decisions are forced.
Under export promotion, political forces within the government, as well
as outside, are likely to be better balanced between those wishing to protect the
domestic market and those seeking to promote external sales. Exporters are
less likely to be dependent on government favors under an export-promotion
strategy simply because their sales are to individuals outside the control of the
government. Their greater independence may itself enable them 'to have more
voice in decisions. Moreover, exporters constitute a proportionately larger
group than in Import-substitution countries, and they have a greater interest at
stake in policies for exports. Of course, groups interested in protecting the
domestic market are always present, so all that can be said is that there may be
a larger offset of other interests under export promotion.
Aside from the fact that exporting interests from the community at large
are better represented, an export-promotion strategy requires that groups
within the government be concerned about export interests. It has already been
stressed that government commitment is really a prerequisite for success of the
strategy. That commitment within the government, plus other pressures, is
likely to constrain policy in a number of ways. For example, the exchange rate
cannot be permitted to become too overvalued unless there are increases in the
size of export subsidies, Those represent a drain on the finance ministry, and
one that is visible to all groups. 23 Thus, within the government the finance
ministry may represent at least one voice for a realistic exchange rate policy.
This viewpoint may be seconded by groups anxious to increase government ex-
penditures on one activity or another and hopeful of using the funds freed
from export subsi
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In comparison, under import substitution, the more overvalued the ex-
change rate becomes, the fewer commodities it pays to export and the less pro-
fitable any particular export becomes. While there are still likely to be some
pressures for a realistic exchange rate, they are likely to be fewer and weaker
under import substitution than under export promotion. It is for this reason
that foreign indebtedness so often is the proximate reason for changing the ex-
change rate when countries are following an import-substitution strategy,
while internal factors usually trigger devaluation under export promotion.
As with the other considerations there is nothing inevitable about the con-
trast. An export-oriented regime could be accompanied by gradual overvalua-
tion of the exchange rate, with a consequent decrease in the rate of growth of
exports and an ultimate abandonment of the strategy. Likewise, an import-
substitution government could maintain a realistic exchange rate and use
tariffs for protecting domestic firms. Too little is understood about the in-
teraction between economic and political phenomena in policy determination
to go further than to indicate that there is some asymmetry in the likelihood of
pressures for equalizing the incentives for exports and for import substitutes
under the two strategies.
The final factor that may affect policymaking is the likelihood that
foreign trade decisions will be made in a crisis atmosphere. Foreign exchange
shortage is a recurring phenomenon under import substitution and QRs. Such
an environment is likely to produce occasional crises as debt service obliga-
tions become due, as the ability to carry out planned investments is threatened,
or as free foreign exchange reserves disappear. Many of the devaluation deci-
sions studied in this project were undertaken in an atmosphere of crisis or else
under foreign pressures, which were effective only because the extremity of the
situation had become apparent.
Either circumstance—crisis or foreign pressure—probably reduces the
likelihood of rational decisionmaking. Actions often must be taken without
prior consultation and discussion with interested parties, and the environment
militates toward short-term rather than long-term solutions. There may be a
greater tendency for mistakes to be committed under import substitution than
under export promotion simply because the likelihood of a crisis is smaller
under the latter type of regime. Recall, for example, the contrast between the
ability of the export-oriented developing countries to respond to the increased
petroleum prices of 1973 and the inability of the import-substitution-oriented
countries to react without severe dislocation.
EVOLUTION OF REGIME OVER TIME
Many of the arguments considered above provide possible explanations
for the apparently more satisfactory performance of the export-oriented
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economies. Yet many of these policy considerations also suggest another
possibility: there are some features of import substitution that are likely to in-
duce intensification of the bias, but an export-promotion strategy places
pressures on policymakers that will serve to limit the extent of bias.
Under an export-oriented system the cost of mistakes becomes visible,
pressures emerge to limit the size of export subsidies and to alter the exchange
rate, and the scope for mistakes is less simply because fewer facets of economic
activity are directly controlled. Moreover, there is some reason for believing
that, once successfully started, further increases in exports may become easier.
Initially locating foreign buyers, penetrating foreign markets, and meeting
labeling, quality, and other foreign specifications may be the hardest part of
exporting. In contrast, under import substitution there is some presumption
that the going will get more difficult as the process continues. As is well
documented for Latin America, once the "easy" initial stage of import
substitution is past, import substitution becomes increasingly difficult. Each
new industry seems to have higher costs and require more technological
sophistication; the econàmic size of plant seems to get larger, while the
domestic market for the industry's output gets smaller. It is therefore likely
that, under an import-substitution strategy, the amount of bias needed to sus-
tain growth over time will increase, if indeed growth can be sustained at all.
Under an export-promotion strategy there does not appear to be any similar
pressure to increase the bias in favor of exports over time.
These considerations do not provide an overwhelming case. Bias toward
import substitution appears to have diminished in Brazil from the mid-1950s
onward, and the same may have happened—albeit to a Lesser degree—in the
Philippines. Nonetheless, in none of the export-push countries do export sub-
sidies appear to have resulted in more than about 25 percent greater return on
exports than on import-substitution activities compared to international price
ratios. By contrast, as Table 6-2 shows, a domestic price ratio of import
substitution to exports almost twice the world price ratio appears in Brazil
(prior to the shift toward exporting), Chile and Turkey (and would undoubted-
ly appear for other countries—including India—if the data were available).
This tends to support the conclusion that an import-substitution strategy may
require a greater degree of bias, maintained through greater use of QRs and
more variance in incentives, than does an export-oriented strategy.
III. CONCLUSIONS
In Chapter 4, four phenomena that can accompany devaluation were iden-
tified: rationalization, liberalization, bias alteration, and variance reduction.
The crucial question was: What is the role of each of these phenomena in
determining the effects of devaluation on the trade and payments regime and
on economic growth?
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One outcome of the NBER project is that fairly definitive answers are
possible on certain aspects of this question. Despite the fact that devaluation
under QRs can, in principle, be of an entirely different nature than devalua-
tion under convertibility, the experience of the ten countries demonstrates that
the same macroeconomic considerations that determine whether deficits will
be reduced after the devaluation of a convertible currency are also important
when QRs are present. This is in part because countries have sometimes
devalued in order to prevent even greater excess demand for foreign.exchange,
but it is also because inappropriate demand management policies can result in
a return of real exchange rates to their predevaluation levels.
Under some circumstances, none of the four phenomena that might ac-
company devaluation under QRs will in fact do so. For this reason, it seems a
fair conclusion that one of the policy mistakes of the two decades covered by
the country studies was using devaluation to a new, fixed exchange rate as an
instrument designed to attain both domestic price stabilization and a liberaliz-
ed trade regime. The adoption of a sliding-peg exchange rate policy would
have freed the fortunes of the trade sector from their dependence upon suc-
cessful price stabilization.
A second important lesson that emerges clearly is that under QR regimes,
with their variety of controls, the parity alteration is not necessarily equal to
the magnitude of devaluation. Policymakers contemplating devaluation would
be well advised to examine the impact of their actions on EER changes;
judgments as to the magnitude of the devaluation should not be based on the
formal parity change.
One of the assertions often made about devaluation has been that it is a
precursor of domestic recession. While recession following devaluation was
neither as universal nor as severe as is sometimes alleged, where it did occur it
was the outcome either of efforts to contain domestic inflation or of an at-
tempt to hold import demand in check. When recession accompanied efforts
to stabilize the domestic price level, it was the price level objective, and not
devaluation, that motivated government policies. When, however, recession
was induced as a means of containing import demand and liberalizing the
regime, it was probably largely unnecessary; foreign lending to support at-
tempts to liberalize and reduce bias is clearly a Pareto-superior choice—if
there are good prospects that the new regime will be maintained. The costs in-
volved in reducing levels of domestic income as a means of containing imports
in the transition period are largely an unnecessary waste.24
As is often the case, the simplest conclusions may also be the most impor-
tant, and that is probably so with regard to the use of EERs, the role of
macroeconomic factors, and the desirability of foreign borrowing to support
the initial liberalization of imports. Those considerations set the stage to ex-
amine the role of the four phenomena accompanying a net real devaluation.
First, and probably most important, almost all devaluations from an initial
position of QRs result in a liberalization of the regime that is not offset by
r
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heightened tariffs. The consequence is that premiums on import licenses are
absorbed, and the premium-inclusive EER for exports increases propor-
tionately (and usually absolutely) more than the premium-inclusive EER for
imports. Liberalization is therefore a powerful bias-reducing action in an
import-substitution, QR-ridden economy.
Reduction in import-substitution bias, as reflected in the export EER,
seems to draw a considerably greater response in terms of export earnings than
has been widely believed, and there can be little doubt that bias is the key
variable of the four. None of the country studies noted a lack of export
responsiveness to the relative increase in export EERs. The widely held view
that exports did not respond to altered real rates in many developing countries
is simply without a factual basis and is contradicted by a considerable body of
evidence.
While devaluation and the measures accompanying it can reduce bias of a
trade and payments regime, they do not reverse it. A sharp distinction must be
made between the response of exports and other variables to raising the real
export EER within the context of a regime biased toward import substitution
and the response that can be forthcoming when a policy commitment is made
toward promoting exports. The rate of growth of export earnings that results
from a realistic export exchange rate under an import-substitution strategy is
certainly greater than that which takes place when the rate is increasingly over-
valued in a Phase II regime. A more satisfactory rate of growth of export earn-
ings facilitates economic growth in a variety of ways, many of them resulting
simply from the absence of the adverse conditions that accompany declining
foreign exchange earnings and reduced import levels.
The reduction in the extent of import-substitution bias that accompanies
devaluation can lead to an improvement in export performance, and it did so
for a variety of countries. While it is possible that variance reduction and ra-
tionalization played a part in the consequent growth, it was not possible to
identify the separate contributions of these variables. What was clear was that
liberalization played a major role through bias reduction, and that it was' the
latter which was really the key variable in determining export behavior. In
turn, export performance was the major mechanism by which the conse-
quences of the devaluation package were transmitted to economic growth.
If devaluation raises the real export EER, bias toward import substitution
is reduced, at least temporarily. Even if the new real exchange rate is maintain-'
ed, that cannot by itself result in a shift in strategy toward export promotion.
That requires not only a substantial and sustained liberalization but also a
variety of measures that provide potential exporters with the same sort of in-
centives that otherwise exist only for firms catering to the domestic market.
Maintaining the real exchange rate is necessary for export promotion, but it is
not sufficient. The truly remarkable growth performances occurred in Brazil
and South Korea when they switched strategies from import substitution to ex-
port promotion.
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NOTES
1. Unless otherwise indicated, data cited for South Korea are from tables in Frank, Kim, and
Westphal, while those for Brazil are from Fishlow's summary.
2. For the years 1957-1959, official grant aid averaged 87 percent of South Korean imports.
Even in 1960, commodity exports were $33 million (of which 88 percent were classified as primary
commodities), imports were $305 million, and the net goods and services balance was minus $262
million. That compares with official grant aid of $256 million in that year.
3. See Table 6-2 for South Korean data. It will be recalled that Brazil's bias toward exports
did not begin until 1968. See Table 9-8 for details.
4. Fishlow summary, pp. 2, 35, 72.
5. Frank, Kim, and Wesiphal, p- 243.
6. Even if the accessibility of the Japanese market had been a significant factor in the rapid
growth of South Korean exports, that consideration would be pertinent only in considering the
repeatability of the export-promotion strategy and not in evaluating the contribution of export
promotion to South Korea's economic growth.
7. For an exposition of the "marketed surplus" and other models of the link between the ur-
ban and rural sectors, see Vernon W. Ruttan, Growth Stage Theories, Dual Economy Models and
Agricultural Development Policy, Department of Agricultural Economics, University of Guelph,
Publication No. AE 196812 (Guelph, Ontario, June 1968).
8. It may well be that the basic explanation lies in the greater foreign exchange earning from
exports than saving from import substitution per unit of resources used, but there are a few data
that bear on that hypothesis.
9. The Indian government cut back real spending on investment for fear that food prices
would increase even faster if investment outlays were maintained. The demand for industrial
goods fell both because of reduced real incomes resulting from the poor harvest and because of
reduced government investment. The alternative of increasing food imports to hold food prices
and increasing investment was not feasible because the import content of the investment goods
plus the import of additional food could not have been financed on reasonable terms.
10. Data from Central Statistical Organization, National 4 ccounts Statistics
1960-61—1972-73 (New Delhi, 1975), Table 3.
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port promotion. It would appear that the dictates of an export-promotion
strategy bring about a variety of conditions which make more rapid growth
possible and, at the same time, constrain policy in such a way as to reduce
variance in incentives and increase rationality of the regime.
Why the export-promotion strategy should appear to be so much more ef-
fective is not entirely understood. A number of hypotheses can be advanced,
all of which undoubtedly make some contribution, but the results of the
NBER project do not entirely resolve the issue. It was also difficult to deter-
mine the relative importance of economic factors—such as economies of scale,
competition, and the great differential in growth rates among firms—com-
pared to the consequences of smaller variance in incentives and constraints on
policy. What does appear certain is that a QR regime must be biased toward
import substitution and cannot be compatible with an export-promotion
strategy.
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11. See Table 2-4.
12. Data from Frank, Kim, and Westphal, Table 6-2 for exports, and Table 2-3, converted at
the official exchange rate, for production.
13. The experience of the South Korean electronics industry illustrates this point. Production
started in the mid-1960s. In 1965, output was $10.6 million, and $1.8 million was exported. By
1973, output was $475 million and $322 million was exported. The industry's growth was therefore
accompanied by increased domestic sales, but with an increasing fraction of output destined for
the international market. See Sang Chul Suh, "Development of New Industry through Exports:
The Electronics Industry in Korea," in Wontack Hong and Anne 0. Krueger, Tradeand Develop-
ment in Korea, Korea Development Institute (Seoul, 1975).
14. It has been argued that productivity growth is not necessarily desirable as long as there is
unemployment. The argument loses force if additional employment does not imply additional out-
put. An even more important counterargt*ment is that firms that can expand their export market
rapidly can expand enough to increase employment despite productivity growth. The experience of
South Korea suggests that increases in productivity did not result from labor-saving activities until
about 1967, when the rural labor supply began to diminish and the real wage started increasing.
15. Of course, a country can maintain a realistic exchange rate and yet be biased toward im-
port substitution. That was the Philippine situation. Even so, pressures to maintain a realistic ex-
change rate are not as great, and the growth consequences of the adjustment, when it does come,
can still be adverse.
16. pp. 237-38.
17. See Robert F. Baldwin, "The Case Against Infant-Industry Tariff Protection," Journal
of Political Economy 77 (May/June 1969):295-305.
18. To the extent that private entrepreneurs prefer to sell in the domestic market because of
international uncertainty, that can constitute rational behavior. At question here is whether addi-
tional incentives should be extended to develop productive capacity for the more certain market.
19. See C. Michalopoulis, Financing Needs of Developing Countries, International Finance
Section, Essay on International Finance Number 10 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975).
20. The reader will note that the same economic and political factors that affect policies and
instruments under each strategy may also determine the initial selection of a strategy. That raises
questions about whether export promotion and import substitution are goals or strategies.
21. The discussion assumes that import licenses are issued for goods competing with domestic
production. If the implicit protection accorded to goods whose importation is prohibited is at least
as great as the premium on import licenses, the bias will be toward import substitution.
22. The government of India attempted to encourage exports by requiring firms to commit
themselves to certain export levels in return for receipt of investment licenses or other favors. The
firms in many cases did comply, but it was the highly profitable sheltered domestic market that
provided an incentive to undertake a small amount of exporting; bias was still strongly toward im-
port substitution.
23. Of course, the subsidy could be financed by across-the-board import duties so that the ex-
port and import EER would both increase. If, however, import rights are conferred to exporters,
that usually provides only a partial offset to the bias toward import substitution (unless the im-
ported commodities do not compete with domestic production).
24. This argument points to the potentially high returns to foreign aid when made available to
support liberalization.
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